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Abstract: Proportionality is the most important principle of constitutional rights law around 
the world, but our theoretical grasp of both the principle itself and the conception of rights of 
which it is the crucial part is still emerging. The goal of this chapter is to contribute to the 
scholarly discussion on proportionality by exposing and exploring an important link between 
proportionality and rights inflation, that is, the phenomenon that increasingly relatively trivial 
interests are protected as rights. My claim is that proportionality is not only compatible with 
rights inflation, but that it necessitates it: under a theory of rights that endorses proportionality, 
there is no coherent way to avoid the conclusion that all autonomy interests should be 
protected as rights, and this includes interests in engaging in trivial and even immoral activities. 
Although this intuitively implausible result may strengthen some in their doubts about or 
rejection of proportionality, this chapter will proceed by showing that, while my argument, if 
correct, necessitates the revision of some widely held views about the nature and justification 
of human and constitutional rights, there is nothing incoherent or unattractive about such a 
view. On the contrary, rights inflation and proportionality are part and parcel of an attractive 
conception of constitutional rights.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Proportionality is the most important principle of constitutional rights law around 
the world, but our theoretical grasp of both the principle itself and the conception 
of rights of which it is the crucial part is still emerging. The goal of this chapter is 
to contribute to the scholarly discussion on proportionality by exposing and 
exploring an important link between proportionality and rights inflation, that is, 
the phenomenon that increasingly relatively trivial interests are protected as rights. 
My claim is that proportionality is not only compatible with rights inflation, but 
that it necessitates it: under a theory of rights that endorses proportionality, there 
is no coherent way to avoid the conclusion that all autonomy interests should be 
protected as rights, and this includes interests in engaging in trivial and even 
immoral activities. Although this intuitively implausible result may strengthen 
some in their doubts about or rejection of proportionality, this chapter will 
proceed by showing that, while my argument, if correct, necessitates the revision 
of some widely held views about the nature and justification of human and 
constitutional rights, there is nothing incoherent or unattractive about such a view. 
On the contrary, rights inflation and proportionality are part and parcel of an 
attractive conception of constitutional rights.  
 
 
 
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
 
Proportionality is a doctrinal tool to establish whether an interference with a prima 
facie right is justified, and this justification succeeds if the interference is 
‘proportionate’ (or alternatively and probably more precisely, if it is ‘not 
disproportionate’). The test consists of four stages:1 first, the interference must 
serve a legitimate goal; second, it must be suitable for the achievement of that goal 
(suitability, rational connection); third, there must not be a less restrictive but 
equally effective alternative (necessity); and fourth and most importantly, the 
interference must not be disproportionate to the achievement of the goal 
(balancing, proportionality in the strict sense).  
                                                     
1 There exist slightly different versions of the test in different jurisdictions. For the purposes of this 
chapter, those differences do not matter as long as balancing features as part of the test. The Canadian 
understanding often tries to avoid explicit reliance on balancing and resolves at the least restrictive 
means stage issues that, in other jurisdictions, are considered at the balancing stage. Denise Réaume 
criticises this, arguing that ‘this question [the question of which of the values is more important], which 
has so often been disguised and hidden elsewhere in the steps of the Oakes test, or simply not been 
addressed, properly belongs at the end of the process, with the other steps serving simply to disqualify 
bad justificatory arguments and refine the ultimate contest’. See Denise Réaume, ‘Limitations on 
Constitutional Rights: The Logic of Proportionality’, (2009) University of Oxford Legal Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 26/2009 at 26. Dieter Grimm makes essentially the same point in his ‘Proportionality 
in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’, (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 383. 
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The principle is best understood as providing guidance in the structured 
resolution of a conflict between a (prima facie) right and another right or a public 
interest. The legitimate goal stage identifies the conflicting value. The suitability 
stage determines the extent to which there is a genuine conflict between the two in 
the sense that one can only be realised at the cost of the other: when a policy 
which interferes with a right does not contribute to the achievement of the 
legitimate goal, then there is no conflict between the right and the goal. The 
necessity stage requires that the conflict be resolved in a way that is as respectful 
of the right as possible; thus, the less restrictive but equally effective alternative 
must be chosen. Although the suitability and necessity stages are important for the 
overall test, in most cases the decisive stage is the balancing stage where the two 
values are balanced against each other. The challenge that proportionality in 
general and balancing in particular present to traditional philosophical theories of 
rights is that they do not recognise any special normative force of rights, for example 
by regarding them as trumps or side constraints.2 Rather, rights operate on the 
same plane as (conflicting) policy considerations, and it is precisely for this reason 
that it is appropriate to ‘balance’ them against conflicting public interests. Robert 
Alexy’s influential theory of rights as principles (which have to be balanced against 
competing principles) captures this feature of contemporary rights jurisprudence 
nicely.3  
 
 
 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE TREND TOWARDS 
RIGHTS INFLATION 
 
Constitutional rights protect autonomy interests such as a person’s interests in life 
and physical integrity, freedom of expression, private life, or freedom of religion. I 
refer to these interests as ‘autonomy’ interests in order to stress that what is 
protected by constitutional rights is not an entitlement to live one’s life in 
accordance with some objectively valuable way of life, but rather one to live it in 
accordance with the agent’s (‘subjective’) self-conception: the agent is prima facie 
entitled to live his life in accordance with his views on who he is and who he 
would like to be, for the determination of which considerations relating to his 
personal history and circumstances and his position within his social environment 
will be crucial.4 This understanding of the freedom protected by constitutional 
rights helps explain the set of traditionally acknowledged rights, such as the right 
to freedom of religion (religion is often an important part of a person’s self-
                                                     
2 On rights as trumps, see inter alia Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’ in Jeremy Waldron (ed), Theories 
of Rights (1984); on rights as side constraints, see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell, 
1974), ch 3. 
3 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002).  
4 I develop this point in greater length in my ‘Two Conceptions of Positive Liberty: Towards an 
Autonomy-based Theory of Constitutional Rights’, (2009) 29 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 757 at 772-
776.  
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conception), private life (which is partly about protecting certain important 
choices, for example relating to sexual relationships and procreation), freedom of 
expression, and others.5 Furthermore, it explains those rights that are not about 
activities, but about what one might call a person’s resources, such as his life, 
property and personal data: autonomy is not, under the conception endorsed here, 
primarily about actions; rather it is about being able to live one’s life, and the 
protection of life, property, and personal data is, for different reasons, important 
for this.6  
The interests and rights mentioned in the previous paragraph have in 
common that they are all relatively important for the purpose of living one’s life. 
What about interests in engaging in activities that are of less importance? 
Especially in Europe, the protection offered by constitutional rights extends to 
relatively trivial interests. The European Court of Human Rights routinely reads 
such interests into the right to private life (Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights). For example, in the famous Hatton case concerning a policy 
scheme that permitted night flights at Heathrow airport, thus leading to noise 
pollution which disturbed the sleep of some of the residents living in the area, the 
Court discovered as part of Article 8 the right not to be ‘directly and seriously 
affected by noise or other pollution’,7 dismissively dubbed ‘the right to sleep well’ 
by George Letsas.8 The broad understanding which the Court takes towards the 
right to private life becomes clear in one of its more recent attempts to 
circumscribe it: 
 
The Court recalls that the concept of ‘private life’ is a broad term not 
susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological 
integrity of a person. It can therefore embrace multiple aspects of the 
person’s physical and social identity. Elements such as, for example, gender 
identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the 
personal sphere protected by Article 8. Beyond a person’s name, his or her 
private and family life may include other means of personal identification and 
of linking to a family. Information about the person’s health is an important 
element of private life. The Court furthermore considers that an individual’s 
ethnic identity must be regarded as another such element. Article 8 protects in 
addition a right to personal development, and the right to establish and 
develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world. The 
concept of private life moreover includes elements relating to a person’s right 
to their image.9 
                                                     
5 Ibid at 776-783.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Hatton v. United Kingdom, (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 28 at para. 96. 
8 George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 2007) at 126.  
9 S v. United Kingdom, (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 50 at para. 66 (references omitted).  
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Thus, the Court has considered the storing of fingerprints and DNA samples by 
the state10 and the publication of photographs of a person in her daily life by a 
magazine11 as falling within the scope of ‘private life’. Article 8 also protects a right 
of access to the information relating to a person’s birth and her origin.12 With 
regard to sexual autonomy, the Court held not only that consensual homosexual 
sex was part of ‘private life’,13 but also that homosexual sado-masochistic group 
sex orgies involving considerable violence were included within the scope of 
Article 8.14 
Although the European Court of Human Rights has not provided a 
comprehensive definition of the meaning of ‘private life’, it requires that the 
interest in question be part of ‘private life’, whatever that term exactly means; thus, 
the Court will not accept any interest as falling within the scope of Article 8. In 
other words, there is a threshold to be crossed for an interest to become a right. 
By way of contrast, the German Federal Constitutional Court has explicitly given 
up any threshold requirement to distinguish a mere interest from a constitutional 
right. As early as 1957, it held that Article 2(1) of the Basic Law, which protects 
everyone’s right to freely develop his or her personality, is to be interpreted as a 
right to freedom of action.15 The Court provided various doctrinal reasons for this 
result, its main argument being that an earlier draft of Article 2(1) had read 
‘Everyone can do as he pleases’ (‘Jeder kann tun und lassen was er will’), and that this 
version had been dropped only for linguistic reasons.16 The Court re-affirmed this 
ruling in various later decisions; most famously, it declared that Article 2(1) 
included the right to feed pigeons in a park17 and the right to go riding in the 
woods.18  
The explanation of this trend towards rights inflation must be found either in 
the unwillingness or the inability of the courts to identify a threshold that separates 
important interests which attract the protection of human or constitutional rights 
from those that are relatively trivial. The following section will examine the issue 
of the threshold by identifying a link between the appropriate scope of prima facie 
rights and the principle of proportionality.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
10 Ibid at para. 67.  
11 Von Hannover v. Germany, (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 1 at para. 53.  
12 Odievre v. France, (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 43 at para. 29.  
13 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149 at paras. 40-41.  
14 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. United Kingdom, (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 39 at para. 36. The Court left the 
question open whether the activities in question fell within the scope of Article 8 in their entirety, but 
proceeded on the assumption that they did.  
15 BVerfGE 6 at 32 (Elfes).  
16 Ibid. at 36-37.  
17 BVerfGE 54 at 143 (Pigeon-Feeding). 
18 BVerfGE 80 at 137 (Riding in the Woods). 
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROPORTIONALITY AND 
RIGHTS INFLATION 
 
The argument of this section is that there is a connection between proportionality 
and rights inflation. It is widely accepted that proportionality analysis is compatible 
with rights inflation: for example, it is perfectly possible to accept, as the German 
FCC does, a right to feed birds, and then to apply proportionality analysis in order 
to establish whether an interference with this right is justifiable. My argument in 
this chapter goes further than this: I claim that proportionality is not only 
compatible with rights inflation, but that it necessitates it. Proportionality and rights 
inflation are two sides of the same coin, or two features of the same conception of 
rights.  
 
1. THE INEVITABILITY OF RIGHTS INFLATION 
 
One of the features of proportionality analysis in general and its balancing stage in 
particular is that rights are not seen as different in structure from mere interests or 
policy considerations: this is why they can and must be balanced against them, as 
opposed to being awarded some special normative force (for example, as trumps 
or side constraints upon action) making them wholly or partly immune to trade-
offs.19 This section will demonstrate that if rights do not hold special normative 
force, then any attempt to limit their scope would be arbitrary; thus, coherence 
requires that rights inflation be embraced.  
What would be wrong with accepting that while rights do not hold special 
normative force, the scope of rights should be limited to certain important 
interests? Consider the example of hobbies: collecting stamps, playing tennis, or 
riding in the woods. Although these hobbies may be reasonably important 
activities for the people engaging in them, they do not display crucial life decisions 
such as whether to procreate, whom to choose as a partner, or which profession 
to take up. Would it not be possible to say that although hobbies have some 
importance for autonomy, this importance is simply not great enough to attract 
the protection of constitutional rights? The idea would be to introduce a threshold of 
importance, and only autonomy interests that reach a certain level of importance 
would be protected as constitutional rights. If protected, any limitation of those 
rights would be permissible only if proportionate; in turn, an autonomy interest 
that did not reach the threshold would not be protected and could therefore be 
limited unrestrictedly. This model, the threshold model, can be contrasted with the 
comprehensive model, according to which any autonomy interest, however trivial, is 
sufficient to attract the protection of constitutional rights.  
                                                     
19 Fred Schauer argues, to the contrary, that rights are worth more than non-rights protected interests. 
See ‘Proportionality and the Question of Weight’, in this volume. 
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An autonomy-based conception of constitutional rights must favour the 
comprehensive model for two reasons. First, under the logic of an autonomy-
based approach, the relevant question must be whether the interest in question has 
some, however small, importance: as long as it has some importance, as is certainly 
the case with the pursuit of hobbies, something would be lost for autonomy if it were 
not protected at all. This leads to the second point: the threshold model would 
have to draw a line somewhere, stipulating that anything below that line falls foul 
of the necessary threshold and is therefore not protected. However, it is hard to 
see how such a threshold could be set in a non-arbitrary way. Would the interest 
have to be of reasonable, average, high, or of fundamental importance? What 
should be the criteria here? The consequence of accepting a threshold at any 
specific level of importance would be that an interest that is just below the 
threshold receives no protection whatsoever, whereas an interest which is just 
above the threshold can only be interfered with in a proportionate manner. This 
difference in protection cannot be justified if all that separates the two interests is 
a tiny margin of importance: it is simply incoherent to attach such morally 
significant consequences to such a small difference in importance. To be sure, we 
might just draw the line somewhere in a pragmatic way and declare that from now 
on, only interests that are at least, say, ‘very’ important are protected. But the 
defining feature of pragmatic approaches to moral questions is the absence of 
principle, and we are looking for a principled approach to limit the domain of 
constitutional rights; therefore, a pragmatic solution is not acceptable. 
To the above conclusion, one might object that it is simplistic to assume that 
the threshold must be set at some level of importance, such as ‘reasonable’ or 
‘high’ importance. Perhaps the threshold points to a qualitative difference? The 
most promising attempt in this direction has been made by James Griffin in his 
book On Human Rights, and his discussion is of particular interest in the present 
context because Griffin’s conception of human rights relies heavily on the value of 
personal autonomy (albeit under a slightly different terminology). He argues that 
the threshold can be derived from the idea of personhood: 
 
Human life is different from the life of other animals. We human beings have 
a conception of ourselves and of our past and future. We reflect and assess. 
We form pictures of what a good life would be […] And we try to realise 
these pictures. This is what we mean by a distinctively human existence […] 
And we value our status as human beings especially highly, often more highly 
than even our happiness. This status centres on our being agents – 
deliberating, assessing, choosing, and acting to make what we see as a good 
life for ourselves.  
 
Human rights can then be seen as protections of our human standing or, as I shall 
put it, our personhood. And one can break down the notion of personhood into 
clearer components by breaking down the notion of agency. To be an agent, in the 
fullest sense of which we are capable, one must (first) choose one’s own path 
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through life – that is, not be dominated or controlled by someone or something 
else (call it ‘autonomy’). […] [And] (third) others must not forcibly stop one from 
pursuing what one sees as a worthwhile life (call this ‘liberty’).20 Griffin tells us 
more about how demanding the right to liberty is: 
 
[L]iberty applies to the final stage of agency, namely to the pursuit of one’s 
conception of a worthwhile life. By no means everything we aim at matters to 
that. Therefore, society will accept a person’s claim to the protection of 
liberty only if the claim meets the material constraint that what is at stake is 
indeed conceivable as mattering to whether or not we function as normative 
agents.21  
 
Griffin’s idea is that ‘personhood’ functions both as the basis of human rights and 
as a limitation on their scope: only those interests that are important for 
personhood are protected as human rights. So we might argue that constitutional 
rights ought to protect only interests that are important for personhood, and that 
constitutional rights protecting personhood can then only be limited when this 
limitation is proportionate. In light of the importance of the value of personhood, 
limitations of rights will normally be disproportionate at least when they are 
pursued for the protection of values that are not grounded in personhood. On this 
account, we might endorse proportionality and reject rights inflation.  
However, this account does not work. Its failure is that the personhood 
approach does not offer a coherent way to delineate interests relevant for 
personhood from other interests. For Griffin, personhood requires autonomy and 
liberty (in my terminology, personal autonomy): basically, control over one’s life. 
But it requires only that kind of control over one’s life that is required by the value 
of personhood. This leaves open the question of what the test is for determining 
whether some instance of liberty (autonomy) is required for personhood. My 
suspicion is that it is simply ‘importance’. For example, Griffin explains that ‘the 
domain of liberty is limited to what is major enough to count as part of the pursuit of 
a worthwhile life’.22 At another point, he defends a human right to gay marriage on 
the ground ‘of its centrality to characteristic human conceptions of a worthwhile 
life’.23 Thus, it seems that the threshold of personhood simply refers back to a 
sliding scale of importance: an interest that is ‘major enough’ or ‘central’ will 
acquire the status of a human right. But such a sliding scale cannot, as explained 
above, do the moral work. The threshold would have to be between ‘not quite 
major enough’ and ‘barely major enough’ or ‘not quite central’, and ‘barely central’. 
                                                     
20James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 32-33 [Griffin, Human Rights]. 
Griffin’s second point, omitted in the quote, is about ‘minimum provision’ of resources and capabilities 
that it takes to be an agent.  
21 Ibid at 167. 
22 Ibid at 234 (emphasis added).  
23 Ibid at 163 (emphasis added).  
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But then, under Griffin’s model, all that separates an interest that is just below 
from one that is just above the threshold is a small difference in terms of 
importance or centrality, and this small difference cannot justify the great 
normative significance that for proponents of threshold models comes with one 
of them being a simple interest and the other a human right. I believe that this is a 
general problem of threshold theories that is not limited to Griffin’s account.24 If 
that is true, then the only possible conclusion is that the threshold requirement 
should be dropped and it should be acknowledged that the scope of freedom 
protected by rights must extend to everything that is in the interest of a person’s autonomy.  
This conclusion sits well with the practice of constitutional rights law and its 
trend towards rights inflation; and herein lies a further indicator of its correctness. 
Someone might object that although such a trend exists, it would still be an 
overstatement to say that constitutional rights law generally protects all autonomy 
interests as rights. This is true insofar as the German account of freedom of action 
as including the rights to go riding in the woods and feed pigeons in the park 
remains an outlier in constitutional rights law around the world. But it must be 
acknowledged that once we agree that the point of constitutional rights is to 
enable people to follow their projects, the inclusion of hobbies loses any flavour 
of absurdity. In fact, on this understanding, the only difference between the 
German approach and other, less generous approaches is that the German 
approach sets the threshold lower, or even sets aside any threshold, whereas other 
jurisdictions continue to follow a threshold model. But the most likely explanation 
for this threshold lies not in a morally different conception of rights, but in a 
simple institutional consideration, namely a sense that constitutional courts should, 
because of their limited resources, only deal with matters of a certain importance. 
This presents only a minor variation in the scope of rights adopted in different 
jurisdictions and leaves intact their moral core as being about protected autonomy 
interests comprehensively understood. 
 
2. THE INCLUSION OF ‘EVIL ACTIVITIES’ 
 
The question whether both liberty and rights, properly understood, include 
immoral or even ‘evil’25 activities such as murdering is a recurrent one in political 
theory.26 The dispute is not about whether such activities can be prohibited – of 
course they can; in fact, taking into account the widely acknowledged doctrine of 
positive obligations, they usually must be prohibited. Proponents of a wide 
understanding of rights include murdering at the prima facie stage, but there is no 
                                                     
24 For a similar view, cf. Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights without Foundations’, in Samantha Besson and John 
Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), at 326 [Raz, “Human 
Rights”].  
25 The point of labelling the activities in question somewhat vaguely as ‘evil’ is to indicate that they are the 
sorts of activities that, because of their extremely harmful and immoral nature, nobody can possibly 
have a definite right to engage in.  
26 See Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Liberty (2002) 166 at 169; Ronald Dworkin, Justice in 
Robes (Harvard University Press, 2006) at 112.  
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doubt that there are reasons of sufficient weight (in particular, the rights of the 
possible victims) in favour of a prohibition, which are to be taken into account at 
the justification stage. In fact, proportionality seems to be ideally suited to conduct 
this inquiry: an approach that first acknowledges  that there is a right to murder 
and then, at the justification stage, deals with the permissible limitations of this 
right addresses all morally relevant considerations and reaches the right 
conclusion. So what is the problem with a right to murder?  
I believe that many will be hesitant about accepting that there is a genuine 
(autonomy) ‘interest’ in engaging in immoral or evil activities. One might argue 
that a person can only have an interest in an activity if that activity carries some 
value; and that since in the case of murdering there is no such value, no interest in 
murdering should be acknowledged. Consequently, a prohibition of murder does 
not engage a person’s interests, properly understood, and is therefore not in need 
of justification.  
However, we must be careful not to confuse two distinct issues. It does not 
follow from the fact that murdering is worthless that we ought to deny the 
existence of an autonomy interest in murdering. If that logic were correct, then a 
person could not possibly have interests, protected by rights, in engaging in 
worthless activities, and that seems wrong. An attractive understanding of the 
freedom protected by constitutional rights cannot protect only those exercises of 
freedom which are valuable. Rather, a commitment to personal freedom includes a 
commitment to moral agency, and this means that it must in principle be left to 
the agent to decide for himself whether a particular activity is morally valuable. For 
example, in the old debates about the decriminalisation of homosexual sex, one of 
the two important arguments was that the question whether homosexual sex is 
valuable is not the business of the state; rather, it is for each agent to decide this 
for himself. (The second argument is that there is nothing morally wrong with 
homosexuality or homosexual sex; but this is an independent point and even if it 
were not true, homosexual sex should be protected by rights.) But this point can 
be generalised and it can be concluded that judging the value of an agent’s project 
is not the business of the state. Thus, the question cannot be whether it is 
objectively the case that murdering (or any other activity) is valuable or not, but 
the crucial question must be whether the activity is valuable from the perspective of the 
agent. If it is, then the agent has an autonomy interest in the activity that must be 
protected by a right.  
This does of course not mean that ‘anything goes’: if someone chooses 
murdering as his project, he should be punished because he violates the rights of 
others. But he should not be punished on the ground that he has chosen a 
worthless project. The same point is captured by Ronald Dworkin’s distinction 
between ethics and morality: ethical questions are about how to live a good life, 
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whereas moral questions concern the duties we owe to each other.27 The prima facie 
stage of rights is solely concerned with ethics in the Dworkinian sense: the 
murderer, as a moral agent, is entitled to decide for himself whether murdering 
promotes or ruins the value of his life. In a community committed to personal 
freedom, judging the value of his projects is the agent’s responsibility and not that 
of the state.  
Under a proportionality-based approach to rights, there must be a right to 
engage in ‘evil’ activities; this can be explained in the following way. There are two 
possible reasons why the state might want to prohibit such activities. The first is 
their ethical worthlessness; but as explained above, judging ethical value is not the 
rightful concern of the state. The second is their immorality. This issue is indeed 
the concern of the state, but under proportionality, it is addressed at the 
justification stage, where the rights of others and relevant public interests are 
considered, and those rights reflect precisely the domain of morality in the 
Dworkinian sense. Adding a ‘morality filter’ for ‘evil’ activities at the prima facie 
stage would lead to conducting the same inquiry at two different stages of the test 
and would thus point to incoherence and structural confusion.  
 
 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR A PROPORTIONALITY-BASED THEORY 
OF RIGHTS 
 
The conclusion of the previous section may embolden some in their scepticism 
about proportionality-based judicial review. It is certainly true that, intuitively, 
many will find the phenomenon of rights inflation troubling and would prefer to 
see it limited rather than comprehensively embraced; and things seem to get even 
worse when immoral and “evil” activities are regarded as falling within the scope 
of rights. My argument in this section will not be that because of those arguably 
counter-intuitive conclusions, proportionality-based judicial review should be 
abandoned or modified. On the contrary, I will argue that both proportionality 
and rights inflation are part of an attractive conception of rights. To grasp its 
appeal, one must dispense with some traditionally held views about human and 
constitutional rights.  
Why do many perceive rights inflation as a troubling development? Rights 
inflation calls into question two related and deeply held views about human and 
constitutional rights: (1) that they protect only interests of a special importance, and 
(2) that it is this special importance which lends rights their special normative force. 
Rights inflation denies both premises: rights do not have a special importance, and 
precisely because of the lack of special importance they do not have special 
normative force. Proportionality affirms this because proportionality, just like 
                                                     
27 Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton University 
Press, 2006) at 21.  
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rights inflation, denies the special normative force of rights, and as shown in the 
previous section, properly understood, it must also deny their special importance.  
Thus, the conception of rights of which rights inflation and proportionality 
are features challenges some views about rights to which many are strongly 
committed. Is it possible to preserve a special role for rights while denying that 
they have special importance and special normative force? I want to propose the 
following account of the point and purpose of human and constitutional rights. 
Human rights are commonly referred to as the rights to which a person is entitled 
simply by virtue of his or her humanity. Most would agree that the best 
interpretation of this very abstract idea has something to do with personal 
autonomy (Griffin would say, autonomy and liberty). But it does not follow that 
we should think about the point of autonomy as being provided with certain 
goods (in particular, freedoms), such as the freedoms to speak one’s mind, choose 
one’s partner, and follow one’s religion. Under proportionality-based judicial 
review, the main entitlement that a human being has simply by virtue of being 
human and with regard to how she lives her life is being treated with a certain 
attitude: an attitude that takes her seriously as a person with a life to live, and that will 
therefore deny her the ability to live her life in a certain way only when there are 
sufficiently strong reasons for this. Applied to the case of hobbies such as feeding the 
birds, this means that we should not ask whether the freedom to feed birds is 
indispensable for making a person a person. Rather, we should ask whether the 
state treats a person subject to its authority in a way which is in line with that 
person’s status flowing from her humanity when the state prohibits, for example, 
her participation in the activity of feeding birds; and this will be the case only 
when there are sufficiently strong reasons supporting the prohibition. Thus, the 
point of rights is not to single out certain especially important interests for 
heightened protection. Rather, it is to show a particular form of respect for 
persons by insisting that each and every state measure which affects a person’s 
ability to live her life according to her self-conception must take her autonomy 
interests adequately into account. 
Rights inflation and proportionality are the two crucial features of a 
conception of rights that embodies this basic idea. Rights inflation is required 
because showing the right attitude towards a person requires taking all of his 
projects seriously, including those of trivial importance and even immoral or ‘evil’ 
ones. Proportionality is required because, properly understood, it assesses precisely 
the question of whether a person’s autonomy interests have been adequately taken 
into account by the policy that interferes with his autonomy. For this to be the 
case, (1) the policy must pursue a legitimate goal; (2) it must be a suitable means of 
achieving that goal; (3) there must not exist a less restrictive but equally effective 
alternative means; and (4) it must not impose a disproportionate burden on the 
right-holder. Where one of these conditions is not met, the reasons for the 
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limitation are not sufficiently strong; where all four conditions are met, they are 
and the policy is therefore constitutionally legitimate.28 This approach makes sense 
of the powerful idea of ‘simply in virtue of being human’ without taking the 
misguided step from that idea to an entitlement to certain especially important 
freedoms. 
Furthermore, this approach helps to rebut an objection that might be raised 
against a conception of rights that endorses rights inflation, namely that it 
succumbs to a conceptual confusion by acknowledging the existence of a right 
without giving an account of its corresponding duties. One might argue that 
something does not become a right simply by virtue of the fact that it is important 
for my autonomy. For example, if it is the case that I enjoy feeding birds in my 
local park, it may follow that I have an autonomy interest in feeding the birds, but 
it may be an entirely different question of whether I do indeed have a right to feed 
the birds. Consider Raz’s famous account of rights: 
 
Definition: ‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other things 
being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for 
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.29 
 
This is sometimes taken to mean that all one needs for a right to come into 
existence is an interest; but this is based on a misunderstanding. Rather, it must be 
the kind of interest which grounds duties in others. Thus, as Raz explains elsewhere, 
just because the love of my children is the most important thing to me, it does not 
follow that I have a right to it.30 To get back to the example of feeding birds, just 
by virtue of the fact that feeding the birds is of some importance to me, it does 
not follow that I have a right to it unless this interest can be shown to ground a 
duty of non-interference in the state.  
The straightforward solution to this problem lies in the distinction between 
prima facie rights and definite rights. A definite right to engage in a particular 
activity indeed grounds a duty of non-interference on the side of the state. The 
prima facie right, by way of contrast, grounds a different duty: the duty of the state 
to take the respective autonomy interest adequately into account. For example, the 
prima facie right to feed birds grounds the state’s duty to take the autonomy interest 
in bird feeding adequately into account in its policy making; and this means that 
feeding birds can only be regulated or prohibited if there exist sufficiently strong 
reasons for such interference (for example the prevention of pollution) which are 
such that they justify the prohibition or regulation in spite of the fact that thereby 
                                                     
28 Cf. Mattias Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of 
Rights-Based Proportionality Review’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141 at 144: ‘[The 
proportionality test] provides little more than a check-list of individually necessary and collectively 
sufficient criteria that need to be met for behaviour by public authorities to be justified in terms of 
reasons that are appropriate in a liberal democracy. In that sense it provides a structure for the 
assessment of public reasons.’ 
29 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986) at 166. 
30 Raz, ‘Human Rights’, supra note 24 at 325.  
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the would-be bird feeder is denied the pursuit of this activity. This understanding 
of rights and their corresponding duties resolves the conceptual puzzle and 
explains why it is indeed coherent to accept a right to everything that is in the 
interest of a person’s autonomy.  
 
 
 
V. WEBBER’S CRITIQUE 
 
In his contribution to this volume, Grégoire Webber objects to splitting up 
reasoning with rights into the prima facie stage, which is concerned with the 
question of whether there has been an interference with the right, and the 
justification stage, where the justification of the interference is examined.31 He 
believes that invoking the concept of a ‘right’ for something to which a person has 
no definite but only an (often quite weak) prima facie entitlement is inappropriate 
because the prima facie ‘right’ does not exhibit what for him is a crucial component 
of the concept of a right, namely its connection with justice. Webber’s objection is 
not to the substance of my theory of rights (it is rather best understood as 
accusing me of semantic sloppiness), and therefore it is possible to reformulate my 
approach in a terminology to which Webber would not object. This will enable me 
to assess whether that terminology is superior to the one which, following an 
emerging global practice, I have adopted in this contribution as well as in previous 
work.  
We could abandon the language of, for example, ‘the right to freedom of 
expression’ and ‘the right to life’ because, as Webber argues, those ‘rights’ cannot 
really be rights, given that they are not absolute: the ‘right’ to freedom of 
expression can be limited, for example in the case of hate speech; and the right to 
life can be limited, for example, in the case of self-defence. Under the approach I 
advocated above, I can easily fix this assumed problem by distinguishing sharply 
between the prima facie right and the definite right, and using the term ‘right’ only 
for the latter. The definite right that every person has is the right to have his or her 
autonomy interests adequately taken into account. Thus, Webber would have no 
objection if instead of a ‘right to life’ I spoke of a ‘right to have one’s autonomy 
interest in life adequately taken into account’, or instead of a ‘right to freedom of 
expression’ I spoke of a ‘right to have one’s autonomy interest in freedom of 
expression adequately taken into account’. Alternatively one could speak, 
following Kumm, of a ‘right to a justification in the case of a limitation of a 
person’s life’ / ‘[...] expression’, and so on. Webber would not even object to 
applying this approach to the right to feed birds or the right to murder: properly 
understood, we would have to speak of a ‘right to have one’s autonomy interest in 
                                                     
31 Grégoire Webber, ‘On the Loss of Rights’, in this volume; also published at LSE Working Paper Series, 
No. 16/2013, available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2272978.  
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bird feeding / murder adequately taken into account’, or alternatively a ‘right to a 
justification of the prohibition of bird feeding / murder’; and at the level of an 
accurate use of the concept of a right there is nothing suspicious about this; or in 
any case, to the extent to which it may still be problematic, it is not Webber’s 
concern in his contribution to this volume. 
Thus, achieving the conceptual precision and accuracy Webber insists on is 
possible, but it comes at a cost: any talk of rights would become semantically 
awkward and complicated. For example, when designing a new constitution or 
human rights treaty, or when discussing issues of rights with fellow citizens, we 
would have to give up including or referring to the ‘right to freedom of religion’, 
the ‘right to property’, and all other commonly acknowledged ‘rights’, except of 
course those that even under the global model are absolute (such as the rights to 
freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and freedom from 
slavery). Instead, to avoid the semantic sloppiness that is at the heart of Webber’s 
concern, we could only use the longer and more awkward formulations that I have 
proposed above.  
I am not convinced that this change would be worthwhile. Judges, academics, 
lawyers, politicians, and ordinary citizens around the world have come to use the 
phrase ‘A has a right to X’ (where X could represent, for example, life, freedom of 
expression, freedom of religion, privacy, property, health care, housing, etc.) in a 
way that, as I argue, is best reconstructed as invoking not a definite entitlement to 
X, but rather a prima facie claim that, when interfered with, requires a justification 
which shows that A’s (autonomy) interests in X have been adequately taken into 
account. On purely pragmatic grounds, I would object to Webber’s proposed 
change of the usage of the term ‘right’ because, first, the transactional costs of 
changing a globally dominant semantic practice would be very high; and, second 
and more importantly, because I find Webber’s alternative, – to replace the 
language of a ‘right to life’, a ‘right to freedom of expression’, etc., with a ‘right to 
have one’s interest in life/expression/etc. adequately taken into account’– 
semantically impossibly awkward.  
Those pragmatic considerations are sufficient to reject Webber’s proposal 
even on the assumption that he is right in his diagnosis that the world has come to 
use the word ‘right’ in a conceptually mistaken way. But there is also reason to 
doubt the correctness of Webber’s diagnosis, because it is based on the misguided 
assumption that the concept of a right has a meaning which is fixed independently 
of the particular conception of political morality within which it has a role to play. 
Thus, he insists that to say that ‘A has a right to X’ necessarily implies that ‘it is 
just that A enjoy X’. The reason for this, for Webber, is that as a matter of history 
of ideas, there is an intimate connection between rights and justice. But if for the 
sake of the argument I grant that this connection is as intimate as Webber claims it 
is, that still leaves open the possibility that we may have made progress in our 
understanding of the concept of a right, much in the same way in which we have 
made or are in the process of making progress with our understanding of other 
concepts, such as the concept of marriage (as being also available to same-sex 
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couples). Under the new, refined understanding of rights, there continues to be a 
connection between definite rights and justice (although I think this connection is 
less straightforward than Webber assumes, but that is not the topic here); and 
there is also a connection between prima facie rights and justice, but it operates in 
a different way, namely via the duty of justification – which is itself a requirement 
of justice – that is triggered by an interference with the prima facie right. Therefore, 
I see no reason to insist that as a matter of semantic or conceptual necessity the 
phrase ‘right to X’ must refer only to a definite entitlement to X and cannot 
possibly refer to an entitlement to have X adequately taken into account. Of 
course, whether it is indeed attractive to use the word ‘right’ in the way that is now 
globally dominant is a different question and will depend on whether this usage 
illuminates the structure of the moral-political issues at stake. But this is a 
substantive question that is not Webber’s concern in his contribution to this 
volume. 
Webber has a valid point, though, that followers of what he labels ‘the 
received approach’ use the word ‘right’ sometimes with regard to the prima facie 
right and sometimes with regard to the definite right. He is certainly right to insist 
that any usage of the word ‘right’ should be consistent. But again, I doubt that the 
stakes are high: once one understands that we have to distinguish between prima 
facie and definite rights, it is in almost all cases entirely clear which of the two we 
are referring to; thus, the potential for a good faith misunderstanding is very low. 
Webber quotes me as arguing that ‘proportionality is simply a structure that guides 
judges through the reasoning process as to whether a policy does or does not 
respect rights’, and takes this as an example of the confusion that may be caused 
by invoking the concept of a right without making it clear whether one means the 
prima facie or the definite right. But I doubt that anyone familiar with contemporary 
human rights discourse would take my statement to mean that proportionality is 
about determining whether a law interferes with (prima facie) rights; rather, it is 
obvious that proportionality is a tool used to determine whether a policy violates 
(definite) rights. The reason I did not specify in the above statement whether it is 
about prima facie or definite rights is precisely that I considered there to be no 
potential for misunderstanding. I do not deny the possibility of there being 
instances in my writing or the writings of other authors where it would have been 
prudent to add ‘prima facie’ or ‘definite’ to the word ‘right’; and to the extent that 
this is so, all of us should pay greater attention to avoid misunderstandings in the 
future. Furthermore, I accept that ordinary citizens without legal training could 
occasionally get confused about rights: for example, a would-be bird feeder could 
respond to the prohibition of bird-feeding in her local park by exclaiming ‘But I 
have a right to feed the birds here!’, and a racist could respond to the banning of 
hate speech by insisting ‘But I have a right to freedom of expression!’. Thus, the 
general point is that people could mistakenly confuse their prima facie rights with 
their definite rights. But again, while I accept that this is a problem, Webber’s 
alternative, which involves the flat denial of the existence of, for example, a right 
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to freedom of expression (because of its lack of absoluteness) would have far 
more confusing and misleading consequences. 
In sum, I do not believe that Webber’s strategy of attacking what he calls the 
received approach and what I have called the global model of constitutional rights 
on the grounds of its using language in a conceptually inaccurate way is promising: 
I could, for the sake of the argument, reformulate my approach in a language to 
which he would not object; but that reformulation would make any discussion of 
rights semantically impossibly awkward and complicated. As I mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, scholars are only beginning to develop theories of the 
global model, including its moral defensibility, and a lot of work remains to be 
done. The most promising engagement with the global model, however, will be 
one that focuses squarely on its moral attractiveness. Thus, it is of course possible 
that my argument in this chapter is wrong as a matter of substance, that both 
rights inflation and proportionality ought to be rejected, and that there exists no 
general right to have one’s autonomy interests adequately taken into account. But 
those points would have to be argued as a matter of substantive engagement with 
my or others’ theories, not as a matter of the conceptually accurate use of 
language.  
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Although the principle of proportionality is widely endorsed in human rights law 
today, the phenomenon of rights inflation is often viewed with suspicion, as 
something that ought to be controlled and pushed back rather than embraced. 
This chapter has argued that the two belong together: we cannot coherently 
endorse proportionality and reject rights inflation. Rather, endorsing 
proportionality implies acknowledging a right to feed birds and even a right to 
murder. But far from concluding that this result shows the absurd consequences 
of a misguided doctrine, this chapter has defended the conception of 
constitutional rights that emerges from the endorsement of rights inflation and 
proportionality: its point is to show a specific kind of respect for persons, which 
requires that every person’s autonomy interests are adequately taken into account 
at all times. To implement this basic idea in a theory of rights, one must accept, 
first, a comprehensive (prima facie) right to autonomy whose function it is to ensure 
that every policy which affects a person’s ability to live his life according to his 
self-conception will interfere with a right and therefore trigger the duty of 
justification. Second, proportionality analysis must be employed at the justification 
stage in order to assess whether a policy pays adequate respect to the right-holder’s 
autonomy interests. Thus, rights inflation and proportionality belong together as 
two building blocks of a globally successful and theoretically attractive conception 
of rights.  
 
